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I’m somewhat embarrassed to admit this, but I think the scariest film 
I’ve ever watched is the 1998 Japanese film Ring directed by Nakata Hideo. 
Embarrassed because, frankly, it’s not exactly what one would describe 
as a deeply thoughtful film or an Oscar contender. And yet it remains a 
memorable movie more than fifteen years after its release: just about half 
of the students in my first-year seminar last year, for example, told me it 
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was their choice for scariest film of all time. Like my students (who were 
too young to have watched it when it appeared in theatres), I happened to 
watch Ring at home on rented video. The moment in the film that did it for 
me was not exactly the famous scene of the long-haired Sadako crawling 
out of the TV set into Takayama Ryuji’s living room, but in fact just before 
that, when the TV screen suddenly buzzes static and then briefly goes blank. 
At the time, I was a jobless post-graduate student in London living with 
some friends of similarly modest means, and our communal TV was a used 
Sony Trinitron box with a coat-hanger antenna and a bloated screen that 
would in fact quite often go fuzzy without warning, especially, I observed, 
when the air was damp. So when the screen went static in the film, I think 
for the briefest of moments it crossed my mind that it might be our TV 
acting up again, and I found myself with an uncanny feeling that I was in two 
spaces at the same time, or more precisely, that I was somehow stuck in 
limbo between two spaces: still immersed in the film, my mind was there in 
Takayama’s living room viewing the monochrome images on his TV screen 
of the creepy well where Sadako was trapped; and simultaneously the fuzzy 
screen partially brought me back to myself and to our North London flat 
where I was watching a rented movie on our Trinitron on a rainy weeknight. 
It was that momentary confusion that got me, I think, and which the next 
scene of Sadako crawling through the TV screen into the living room (Still 
in black and white no less!) exploited to such hair-raising excess. (Later, 
when we had finished watching the film and one of my flatmates turned off 
the VCR without first turning down the volume on the TV, thereby making it 
suddenly blast static again, well, that really scared the bejabbers out of me… 
but that’s another story.)
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Nakata’s film was adapted from an eponymous novel written in 1991 by 
Suzuki Koji, which in turn, according to an interview with Suzuki, was at 
least partially inspired by a short story written in 1918 by Tanizaki Jun’ichiro, 
“The Tumor with a Human Face” (“Jinmenso”). In terms of plot Tanizaki’s 
story is in fact completely different from Ring, consisting largely of a plot 
summary of a film within the story, and nothing at all about a crazy-psychic 
witch-girl trapped in a well. What Ring does borrow from Tanizaki’s story is 
the plot device of a haunted film whose curse affects those who watch it—
that is, the idea that something within a film could breach the movie or TV 
screen that separates a film’s internal diegetic reality from the spectator’s 
external reality, and have a direct effect on the spectator. In the case of Ring, 
it is the evil spirit of Sadako mysteriously kept alive on a videotape, and in 
the case of “The Tumor” the curse of a character within a film that drives 
those who watch it mad. Writing in 1926, Virginia Woolf famously observed 
that when we watch a film, “[w]e see life as it is when we have no part in it” 
(349); but in Tanizaki’s story and Nakata’s film, the point is that we cannot 
be so certain of our supposedly safe distance from the life depicted in films. 
Moreover, both Ring and “The Tumor” have at their center a modern visual 
technology— film and video—haunted by an exotic, evil spirit that feels 
anything but modern, and it is that uneasy mixture of modern science and 
pre-modern evil, the technological and the supernatural, that Ring takes up 
in homage to Tanizaki’s story.
The loose links between Tanizaki’s short story and Nakata’s film are of 
interest not so much from the standpoint of analyzing how literature-to-film 
adaptations work per se, but rather with respect to what they each suggest 
about certain aspects of the experience of viewing films, aspects which 
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are often taken for granted and remain underanalyzed. Thomas LaMarre 
writes that at the heart of “The Tumor” there is “tension between affect and 
narrative” (105), that is to say, an indeterminacy between sensory shock and 
narrative suspense. In this article, I want to explore this tension between 
affect and narrative not just in Tanizaki’s story, but more generally as a 
fundamental aspect of the ontology of film. My discussions will primarily 
center on Tanizaki’s short story, but with an eye towards what Nakata’s 
film picks up in terms of technological affect from Tanizaki. I am interested 
in what the short story “The Tumor with a Human Face” and the film Ring 
suggest about film not so much as a narrative medium similar to literature 
but more importantly as a technologically embedded, sensory experience 
that radically differs from literature.
As a starting point for considering these issues, I shall borrow the 
distinction between microperception and macroperception that the 
philosopher of technology Don Ihde develops with regard to how we 
perceive and engage with the surrounding world. Here are Ihde’s definitions 
of these two key terms:
What is usually taken as sensory perception (what is immediate 
and focused bodily in actual seeing, hearing, etc.), I shall call 
microperception. But there is also what might be called a cultural, or 
hermeneutic, perception, which I shall call macroperception. Both 
belong equally to the life world. And both dimensions of perception are 
closely linked and intertwined. (29)
Ihde uses these terms to theorize how, as Vivian Sobchack explains, 
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“perceptual and representational technologies such as photography, motion 
pictures, television, video and computers in-form us twice over: first through 
the specific material conditions by which they latently engage and extend our 
senses at the transparent and lived bodily level […] and then again through 
their manifest representational function by which they engage our senses 
consciously and textually at the hermeneutic level” (Sobchack 138). While 
the vast majority of film criticism emphasizes the latter macroperceptual 
level of hermeneutic-cultural contexts within which a film is materially and 
socially embedded, my emphasis is on the former microperceptual level of 
our sensory and physical engagement with film. That is to say, more than as 
a medium of story-telling as such, I am interested in how films engage us at 
a more—How shall we say it?—  “unconscious,” sensory-bodily level: how 
it creates the illusion of movement and life; how it manages to immerse, or 
better, suture us seamlessly in a cinematic reality through techniques and 
devices such as montage, close-up, camera angle, and so on; and ultimately 
how it manages to have a direct “bodily” effect on us. As I will discuss, it 
is something akin to the distinction between the microperceptual and the 
macroperceptual— the sensory and the hermeneutic— that informs the 
“tension between affect and narrative” at the center of Tanizaki’s interest in 
film as an emerging aesthetic form in the early-twentieth century.
Some readers may be skeptical about my admittedly casual use of 
potentially problematic terms like the “unconscious” versus “conscious” 
aspects of viewing films, or the “sensory-bodily” versus the “cultural-
hermeneutic” levels of perception, as if these paired terms can be trusted 
to form such neat oppositions. Where do we draw the line, one might 
ask, between “sensory” and “culturally filtered” levels of perception? On 
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what grounds are the senses more “immediate” than contemplation and 
interpretation? In fact, these questions help us to clarify an important aspect 
of how Ihde understands the relationship between the microperceptual 
and macroperceptual. Even as Ihde distinguishes between these two 
levels of perception, his point is not to suggest that the sensory-bodily 
and the cultural-hermeneutic can actually be neatly separated from each 
other or that the former is somehow “prior” (pre-cultural, universal) to 
the latter. Rather his distinction is developed on the premise that the two 
levels of perception are always already inextricably intertwined and even 
indistinguishable. By microperceptual, Ihde is not positing a pure level of 
sensory experience that is unfiltered by culture, or some level of perceiving 
that is free of material, historical contingencies. In fact, his premise is 
precisely the opposite— that microperception is by nature techno-logical, and 
hence also (like macroperception) always already grounded in historically 
contingent material conditions.
Ihde’s understanding of technology, in this regard, follows from that of 
Martin Heidegger, in that for Ihde technologies do not just mediate our 
presence to the world but in fact constitute it: that is to say, technology 
does not come between us and the world in the manner of a filter; rather 
technology is always constitutive of our way of being-in-the-world. Thus 
to analyze the microperceptual is not to posit some pre-technological or 
pre-cultural mode of perception that is liberated from history, but indeed 
to consider how we learn to perceive technologically through history, and—
borrowing Sobchack’s shorthand— to study the particular “techno-
logic” of a historical moment. Emphasizing the microperceptual over the 
macroperceptual, therefore, does not deny historical material contingencies, 
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but in fact affirms their existence at the most fundamental levels of our 
presence to the world. If, to borrow Marshall McLuhan’s dictum, “the 
medium is the message,” that is because the medium is never a neutral form 
or container for a political content, but instead is a material and historically 
contingent element that determines content. And as we shall see, film for 
Tanizaki was not simply a new visual medium but more precisely a new 
perceptual mode of being-in-the-world: that is to say, Tanizaki puts forth 
an ontology of film. To consider how Tanizaki understood the techno-logic 
of film as a sensory mode of being, first we need to position Tanizaki’s short 
story in relation to the history of film.
Narrative Cinema or a Cinema of Attractions?
As Thomas LaMarre has detailed, Tanizaki’s intense interest in film as 
a newly emerging art form is apparent from many of his works and essays 
written as early as 1912 and through the rest of the 1910s and 1920s. 
Worldwide, this coincides with the period when a new critical discourse on 
film was developing especially in Europe and the United States surrounding 
the theories of people like Béla Balázs, Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin 
and Jean Epstein. And as Aaron Gerow, Joanne Bernardi and others have 
debated at great length, critical interest in film was also significant in Japan 
during these early years, with a popular film discourse emerging from 
journalistic reviews of movies eventually coalescing—however loosely—
into the so-called Pure Film Movement (jun eiga undou) from about 1915. 
Although the Pure Film Movement, for which Tanizaki declared his support 
at a very early stage, was by no means a unified project based on anything 
like a core manifesto or set of principles, what one can observe is a shared 
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interest in exploring the possibilities for a uniquely cinematic art distinct 
from other arts like literature and drama.
In this historical context, Tanizaki’s early interest in the film industry and 
in film as a newly emerging art is remarkable. This was a period in which 
critical discourse was increasingly turning its attention towards ways in 
which film as a narrative form could distinguish itself from literature and the 
traditional stage, and in this respect the fact that a respected novelist like 
Tanizaki was increasingly immersing himself in the still nascent medium 
comes as a surprise. Modernist literary movements that drew heavily on 
cinematic elements, such as the New Sensation School (shinkanku-ha) led 
by writers like Yokomitsu Riichi and Kawabata Yasunari, would not take off 
until the mid-1920s, and the major film-related writings of literary figures 
like Kobayashi Hideo and Osaki Midori would not yet appear until the early-
1930s. In contrast, Tanizaki was already penning film essays in the mid-
1910s and publicly announced a desire to write photoplays in 1917. In 1920, 
Tanizaki was offered a position as a literary consultant by the newly formed 
Taikatsu Studios (Taisho katsuei kaisha), and announced that he would 
put his literary career on hold to work in the film industry full time. Hence 
“The Tumor” written in 1918 appeared at a time when Tanizaki was deeply 
immersed in his explorations of film art, and when Tanizaki himself could 
be said to have been in a transitional phase of experimentation working at a 
crossroads between literature and film.
In line with the so-called Pure Film Movement, Tanizaki was interested in 
exploring and developing film as a new and distinct aesthetic form, and this 
tendency is apparent in the intense attention paid to various film techniques 
such as montage, double exposure and close-up in “The Tumor”. As 
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LaMarre explains “The attention lavished on film effects like camera angle, 
magnification (or close-up), and superimposition creates the impression 
that narrative is of little or lesser importance” (105). Later, we will discuss 
in depths how Tanizaki presents and uses such film techniques and his 
explorations of the ways in which such techniques affect film viewers at the 
microperceptual level; but first, it is useful to consider the development of 
such film techniques in the early history of film in general, and see how such 
techniques were connected to the development of film as both a narrative 
and affective form. The issue of the role of new cinematic techniques in early 
film history, however, is by no means free of controversy, and needs to be 
approached with care. Two versions of early film history are of particular 
importance.
The first is the classical view of early film history which focuses on film’s 
divergence from traditional stage theatre and the development of narrative 
film, running from when the medium first appeared in the late-19th century 
through to the mid-1910s when the cinematic narrative form is understood 
to have settled on a core set of formal elements and crystalized. Classical 
film historians and theorists such as Jean Mitry, Georges Sadoul, and Lewis 
Jacobs tend to see the first two decades or so of film history as a kind of 
developmental phase, when producers of film were still searching for and 
developing the uniquely cinematic techniques which would eventually 
allow film to achieve the goal of effectively telling a story. For classical film 
historians, narrative film has its origins in the traditional theatre where, in 
the most primitive cases, a camera was used to record a stage production and 
the resulting film consisted of simply reproducing it. Crucial for historians 
like Mitry, Jacobs, Sadoul and others is the evolutionary development of 
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cinematic techniques like close-up, shooting angle, camera mobility, and 
cutting and editing, which allowed cinema to differentiate itself from theatre 
and develop an inherently cinematic logic and grammar for narrative. Mitry, 
for example, frames early film history before WWI as a struggle between 
theatricality and narrativity, and sees the development of film techniques 
as one of the keys for film to liberate itself from theatre and develop as a 
narrative form in its own right. Because film was mute, it had to compensate 
for this lack by developing unique visual narrative techniques, which became 
the essence of film as a mature narrative form in the 1910s. One is tempted 
to draw parallels between classical film history and understandings of the 
Pure Film Movement, which is also based on the premise that the 1910s and 
1920s were a phase in which film practitioners and critics were searching 
for uniquely cinematic techniques that would distinguish film from literature 
and the stage.
A second version of early film history put forth by Tom Gunning and 
others in the 1980s is one that displaces narrativity from its privileged 
position in that history, and puts forth the alternative notion of a “cinema of 
attractions.” According to Gunning, the problem with classical film history 
is that it is fundamentally teleological, basing itself on the premise that the 
development of narrative was the central concern for producers of films 
from the earliest moments of its history even before its uniquely narrative-
oriented techniques had been developed. The evolutionary logic at the heart 
of classical film theory assumes that the earliest producers of film already 
recognized narrativity as the essence of film almost from the time of the 
technology’s birth, and that they steadily developed the film techniques that 
eventually allowed narrativity to be brought to the forefront in a uniquely 
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cinematic manner. In contrast to classical film historians, Gunning argues 
that, prior to the Nickelodeon boom that reaches its peak at about 1908, 
narrative was not an obvious end-goal of films, and that there was not yet a 
clear recognition that the essential “point” of film was to tell a story. Instead, 
Gunning traces early film back to its origins in the nineteenth-century 
fairground where it developed as a curiosity-arousing attraction that, 
like the stereoscope, the peepshow and a host of other visual attractions, 
foregrounded the act of display. That is to say, the appeal of film was seen 
to lie in the visual effects of film, its ability to expand and transform visual 
experience. In Ihde’s terms, we could say that it was at the microperceptual 
level of sensory experience that film was marketed to audiences instead of at 
the macroperceptual level of narrative.
Viewed in this light, we see that film in its early days was not understood 
as a device that would neutrally record acts or events, and the classical 
argument that early film essentially started as a tool for recording and simply 
reproducing theatrical stage productions breaks down. “Rather,” Gunning 
argues,
even the seemingly stylistically neutral film consisting of a single-shot 
without camera tricks involved a cinematic gesture of presenting for 
view, of displaying. The objects of this display varied among current 
events (parades, funerals, sporting events); scenes of everyday life 
(street scenes, children playing, laborers at work); arranged scenes 
(slapstick gags, a highlight from a well-known play, a romantic 
tableau); vaudeville performances (juggling, acrobatics, dance); or 
even camera tricks (Méliès-like magic transformations). But all such 
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events were absorbed by a cinematic gesture of presentation, and it was 
this technological means of representation that constituted the initial 
fascination of cinema. (42-43)
To illustrate the prominent role of attraction over narrative in early film 
history, Gunning provides the examples of pioneers like Georges Méliès 
and Charles Pathé, in whose works, “attractions could be crossbred with 
narrative forms, but with attractions still dominating, so that narrative 
situations simply provided a more naturalized way to move from one 
attraction to the next” (48). For example, Méliès would sometimes use a 
well-known fairy tale to provide logical connections between a series of 
cinematic tricks involving dissolves, multiple-exposure shots, or time-lapse 
photography: in effect, the storyline served as a “pretext” for presenting 
attractions.
Gunning’s point is not that narrative had no place before the Nickelodeon 
era, but rather that “attractions most frequently provide the dominant for 
film during this period and often jockey for prominence until 1908 or so 
(and even occasionally later)” (43). And further, Gunning argues that after 
1908, even as narrative becomes a dominant in the classical film of the 
1910s onwards, it develops a “potentially dynamic relation to nonnarrative 
material” (43), so that display and attraction were by no means abolished 
by the classical paradigm. Gunning’s notion of a cinema of attractions, 
therefore, has important implications for our understanding of film history 
after 1908 as well, when we consider that while narrative did indeed become 
a dominant in the classical era, this did not mean that display and attraction 
were necessarily subsumed in the service of narrative. In the language 
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of psychoanalysis, we might venture that on the one hand the cinema of 
attractions engages the spectator at the level of the imaginary— that is, at 
the level of sheer shock, joy, fascination and other affects triggered by the 
perceived motion in front of one’s eyes; on the other hand, narrative cinema 
could be said to engage the spectator at the symbolic level, where actions 
and gestures take on symbolic significance and narrative meaning. And just 
as the symbolic is enmeshed in the imaginary and thus does not oust or 
replace it, so the historical development of narrativity in film does not signal 
the abolishment of the affective force of nonnarrative, visual effects.
What then are the primary differences between the classical paradigm 
of cinema as narrative and the notion of a cinema of attractions? Gunning 
focuses on two interrelated aspects. One is a difference of temporality. Citing 
Roland Barthes and Russian Formalism, Gunning argues that the essential 
temporality of classical narrative depends on suspension. Narrative in its 
classical form works by presenting an enigma—or from a psychoanalytic 
perspective, establishing a desire—which demands some kind of solution 
or fulfilment. The art of narrative, then, consists of “delaying the resolution 
of that enigma, so that its final unfolding can be delivered as a pleasure long 
anticipated and well earned” (43). In contrast, the primary temporality of the 
cinema of attractions is one of immediacy, depending on affects like surprise 
and shock. Rather than steady build-up and suspense, attraction depends on 
immediate display and spectacle, a constant present that continuously says 
“Here it is! Look at it!” Thus if we take the example of Georges Méliès again, 
as John Frazer remarks, “We experience his films as rapidly juxtaposed jolts 
of activity. […] Méliès’ films are a collage of immediate experiences which 
coincidentally require the passage of time to become complete” (124).
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The second difference between classical narrative cinema and the cinema 
of attractions concerns the presence of the film viewer in relation to the 
film. Gunning points out that in the paradigm of classical narrative film, the 
pursuit of the initial narrative enigma “takes place within a detailed diegesis, 
a fictional world of places and characters in which the action of the narrative 
dwells” (43). “From a spectatorial point of view,” he continues,
the classical diegesis depends not only on certain basic elements of 
coherence and stability but also on the lack of acknowledgement of the 
spectator. As the psychoanalytically shaped theory of [Christian] Metz 
claims, this is a world that allows itself to be seen but that also refuses 
to acknowledge its complicity with a spectator. In the classical diegesis, 
the spectator is rarely acknowledged, an attitude exemplified by the 
stricture against the actor’s look or gestures at the camera/spectator. 
As Metz says, the classical spectator becomes modeled on the voyeur, 
who watches in secret, without the scene he watches acknowledging his 
presence. (43-44)
Narrative cinema, in other words, functions on the premise of an internal 
story-world reality independent of the spectator’s external reality.
In contrast, in the cinema of attractions the spectator’s presence is 
explicitly recognized by the film. The magic tricks in Méliès’ films, for 
example, are directed at the film’s spectators, and there is no sense in 
denying their presence. Gunning raises another example from 1896, The 
Black Diamond Express directed by James H. White, which opens with a shot 
of a locomotive coming straight towards the camera, so that the spectator 
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experiences the immediate terror of what it would be like to stare down 
an onrushing train. Important here is that the film does not yet set up an 
independent, diegetic reality into which viewers voyeuristically peer in—
that is, a fictional reality that is represented on the screen—and instead, 
spectators are directly watching the film and its technologically embedded 
vision—a presentational effect in which the film is addressing the spectator 
directly.
Narrative in “The Tumor with a Human Face”
How then do we position Tanizaki and “The Tumor with a Human Face” 
in relation to the early history of film? Let us return for the moment to the 
“tension between affect and narrative” which LaMarre observes in Tanizaki’s 
short story. According to LaMarre, this tension emerges out of the unique 
structure of Tanizaki’s work involving a film within the story. Because much 
of the story involves descriptions of the film, what is particularly interesting 
is the way in which it sways back and forth between the film’s storyline and 
its remarkable cinematic effects.
“The Tumor with a Human Face” starts with Utagawa Yurie, an actress 
recently back in Japan after a stint in Hollywood, hearing rumors of an 
obscure film in which she plays the leading role but of which she has no 
memory of ever acting in. Yurie gets details about the mysterious movie 
from certain individuals familiar with the film, and learns not just about 
its storyline but also about its amazing use of cinematic techniques such 
as double exposure and montage, the quality of which are apparently 
outstanding, as well as about the film’s terrible effects on viewers. In the film, 
a courtesan Ayame Daifu (played by Yurie) and her American lover convince 
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a beggar who is in love with her to help her escape from her brothel, with 
the promise that later she will spend a night with him. After succeeding in a 
daring escape with the beggar’s help, however, Ayame breaks her promise 
with him; in a fit of rage the betrayed beggar takes his own life vengefully 
cursing Ayame. As Ayame makes the long trip across the Pacific to start 
her new life in America, she develops a tumor on her knee that gradually 
takes on the appearance of the maniacal, laughing face of the ugly beggar. 
In America, she makes several attempts to find success and happiness, but 
her attempts are inevitably frustrated by the terrible tumor. The film ends 
with Ayame, driven to madness by the relentless tumor, committing suicide. 
The rumor surrounding this film is that when people watch it alone in a dark 
room, they become unable to rid their minds of the terrible image of the 
beggar’s silent, laughing face superimposed on Yurie’s knee, and eventually 
go mad themselves.
The film is shrouded in a number of mysteries, one of the strangest of 
which is the question of how such a film could have been made without 
the knowledge of its leading actress: Where does the footage of her come 
from? Could Yurie have forgotten that she played this role? One possible 
explanation is that the film was spliced together using footage from various 
other movies in which she appeared; another is that she had never been 
given details about the movie she was acting in:
In so far as she actually appeared in the flesh in the motion picture, she 
must have filmed it somewhere at some time or another. Nevertheless, 
she had no memory at all of acting in such a drama. When one acts in 
drama that are filmed for the screen, one does not follow the sequence 
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of events in order, as is conventional in stage theater, but rather one 
selects scenes from the play according to their convenience rather 
haphazardly, filming without concern for their order. With moving 
pictures, it so happens that, in many instances, an actor remains 
ignorant of the plot of the drama in which he is acting, filming in a 
single location at the same time two or three scenes from completely 
different plays. In particular with the Globe Company in which Yurie 
was employed, directors adopted a policy of keeping the actors entirely 
in the dark about the story. […] For this reason, although Yurie had 
filmed a countless number of scenes during her few years with Globe, 
she herself could scarcely imagine at the time what sorts of drama the 
scenes would compose, or how many different narratives would be 
assembled. (Tanizaki 93)
The mysterious film in which Yurie appears in fact seems to be made up of 
scenes from films of various genres, involving Yurie as an Oriental courtesan 
in certain scenes, or as a seductive “dragon-lady” that tempts Western men 
in other scenes, or as a beautiful aristocratic lady in still other scenes. Thus 
footage intended for one film might have been used for the romantic scenes, 
footage intended for another for the courtesan’s daring escape from the 
Japanese brothel, and footage intended for still another for the European 
ball scene, and so on. Such pre-existing footage, it is explained, could have 
been superimposed and spliced with footage of other characters and, using 
sophisticated cinematic techniques as well as the right intertitles, an entirely 
new film could have been created.
This explanation that the haunted film could have been made without 
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the knowledge of its actors by combining other pre-existing scenes draws 
our attention to the mass-produced nature of movies in the 1910s, when 
genres were becoming increasingly standardized to create a familiar 
set of expectations for film audiences. In this context, typically movie 
characters were developed as easily recognizable generic character-types. 
For example, costumes and props often functioned more as denotational 
symbols than individualizing traits: Armor and a sword to signify a knight; 
a top-knot to indicate an Oriental male; a corpulent cigar-smoking male 
in a pin-striped suit to represent a fat-cat banker; a kimono for a Japanese 
courtesan. In other words, a standardized iconography of generic visual cues 
and symbols had by this time been established in film and, according to the 
logic of Tanizaki’s short story, such visual cues and symbols could be taken 
apart and rearranged— that is, re-edited— to form a new cookie-cutter film. 
In this respect, we see that narrative is presented as a secondary aspect of 
film, thrown together from pre-existing footage using the basic techniques 
of montage and superimposition. We might say that the notion of cinematic 
narrative in Tanizaki’s short story is not unlike Méliès’ use of narrative as a 
convenient “pretext” for showcasing certain scenes, in this case a series of 
genre signifiers. This is Tanizaki’s version of ‘the work of art in the age of 
mechanical reproduction’, where art is welded together on the factory line.
Virginia Woolf takes up a similar point in her 1926 essay on cinema which 
I quoted from earlier, when she discusses how films are adapted from works 
of literature, and laments what happens when film’s clumsy visual signs 
cannot do justice to their original literary referents:
All the famous novels of the world, with their well-known characters 
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and their famous scenes, only asked, it seemed, to be put on the films. 
What could be easier and simpler? The cinema fell upon its prey with 
immense rapacity, and to the moment largely subsists upon the body 
of its unfortunate victim. But the results are disastrous to both. The 
alliance is unnatural. Eye and brain are torn asunder ruthlessly as they 
try vainly to work in couples. The eye says ‘Here is Anna Karenina.’ A 
voluptuous lady in black velvet wearing pearls comes before us. But the 
brain says, ‘That is no more Anna Karenina than it is Queen Victoria.’ 
[…] So we lurch and lumber through the most famous novels of the 
world. So we spell them out in words of one syllable, written, too, in the 
scrawl of an illiterate schoolboy. A kiss is love. A broken cup is jealousy. 
A grin is happiness. Death is a hearse. None of these things has the 
least connexion with the novel that Tolstoy wrote […]. (349-350)
Woolf here captures the inadequacy of cinema’s language of generic visual 
symbols for approximating the nuances of works of literature, and presents 
a damning assessment of the cinema as a narrative art, especially in the case 
of literature-to-film adaptations.
Likewise for Tanizaki as it was for Woolf, we see that narrative was a 
secondary element of film, very often something clumsily spliced together 
within the limits allowed by the developing Hollywood genre system. The 
emerging code of visual language through which cinematic narrative was 
formed had to be a matter of clear and precise symbols, without room 
for subtlety or polysemy: A kiss is love; a broken cup jealousy; a grin is 
happiness; and death is a hearse. Narrative cinema for both Tanizaki and 
Woolf, we see, was more often than not a matter of clumsy signs and 
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referents.
Microperceptual Affect in “The Tumor with the Human Face”
Nonetheless, Tanizaki, as well as Woolf, was fascinated by film. Despite 
its ineptness as a narrative medium, both writers were keenly aware of film’s 
affective force and power to enrapture its audiences. Joseph and Barbara 
Anderson have famously written about the double logic that accompanies 
us when we watch films, summarizing something similar to Tanizaki’s 
experience of film. On the one hand, they write, “We know that the individual 
pictures of a motion picture are not really moving, and that our perception of 
motion is therefore an illusion.” On the other hand, they also point out, “To 
the visual system, the motion in a motion picture is real motion” (quoted in 
Wood 5). In other words, understanding the technology behind the illusion 
does not undermine the illusion: We know that our eyes are being tricked, 
yet we suspend that knowledge and allow our perception to be immersed 
and embedded in the machinic experience. The fascination of film for 
Tanizaki is what happens at this microperceptual level of machinic vision. In 
the following passage from “The Tumor with a Human Face,” Yurie’s friend 
M explains the strange power that movies can have on people when they 
watch them alone:
In M’s long experience with moving pictures, to watch a film with 
a crowd of spectators at theaters in Asakusa Park with music and 
vaudeville banter produces feelings of exhilaration and merriment, 
but to watch a film all alone in a dark room without sound or dialogue 
somehow causes ghostly and quite uncanny sensations. This is true of 
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course with quiet, desolate images, yet even with scenes of banquets 
and skirmishes, as the images of so many people in action flicker, you 
feel not so much that they are lifeless but rather you have the sensation 
that you who watch, you yourself are about to vanish. (99)
Here M suggests that, especially when one is completely alone in a dark 
movie theatre, the constructed reality on the screen takes on a reality that is 
more real than one’s own, so that the spectator’s self-presence is completely 
lost and “you yourself are about to vanish.” In LaMarre’s words, “Watching 
highly animated scenes, one feels that the life force of film is far greater than 
one’s own” (106). We are reminded again of Woolf’s description of the film-
viewing experience: Watching a series of scenes involving various people 
and objects, she writes,
They have become not more beautiful in the sense in which pictures are 
beautiful, but shall we call it (our vocabulary is miserably insufficient) 
more real, or real with a different reality from that which we perceive 
in daily life? We behold them as they are when we are not there. We 
see life as it is when we have no part in it. As we gaze we seem to be 
removed from the pettiness of actual existence. (349)
We see then that for both Tanizaki and Woolf, the true potential of film 
lies in its ability to create a seamless illusory reality and a state of complete 
immersion, so that viewers are absorbed by the film to a point that they seem 
to disappear. Important to note here is that this absorption is not an effect of 
narrative in the sense of, say, how Christian Metz understands suture. For 
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Tanizaki and Woolf, absorption is not a contemplative, active engagement 
with the film’s narrative, but rather a passive receptive engagement, in which 
the film takes over ones sensory mode of being.
In The Emergence of Cinematic Time Mary Anne Doane reminds us of 
the strange reality we inhabit when we watch a film, further developing the 
idea that the movement we perceive in film is in fact an illusion constructed 
by discrete frames flickering in front of our eyes coming from a projector 
positioned behind us. Furthermore, Doane points out that it is our brains 
that do the actual work of illusion, connecting the spaces between frames 
and creating the continuity of movement to create what she calls the internal 
“real time” of film. “This temporal continuity,” she writes, “is in fact haunted 
by absence, by lost time represented by the division between frames. 
During the projection of a film, the spectator is sitting in an unperceived 
darkness for almost 40 percent of running time” (172). This is a provocative 
idea, to think that our brains do not just connect together the discrete 
images flickering on the screen, but also erase from experience the gaps 
between those images. In the passages quoted above, both Tanizaki and 
Woolf seem to suggest a similar experience, in which the brain becomes 
so immersed in the construction of the cinematic reality that it threatens 
to blot out completely from perception the external reality which the film 
viewer physically inhabits. Not only does the viewer sit in an “unperceived 
darkness,” Tanizaki and Woolf suggest that the viewer affectively eliminates 
his or her own existence from perceived reality: this is the example par 
excellence of the technologically embedded nature of perception.
Doane’s point regarding “unperceived darkness” suggests that the 
human sensory capacity to exclude is a dynamic aspect of the construction 
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of cinematic reality and is fundamental to the techno-somatics of film. 
But what happens when sensory exclusion fails, and the embedding of 
mind in film is undermined? For an example of such an instance, again we 
can look to Woolf. After describing the adaptation of Anna Karenina and 
seemingly despairing of film as a narrative art, Woolf proceeds to describe 
an experience that revealed for her the true potential of film:
But what, then, are its [film’s] devices? If it ceased to be a parasite [of 
literature through adaptation], how would it walk erect? At present it 
is only from hints that one can frame any conjecture. For instance, at 
a performance of Dr. Caligari the other day a shadow shaped like a 
tadpole suddenly appeared at one corner of the screen. It swelled to an 
immense size, quivered, bulged, and sank back again into nonentity. For 
a moment it seemed to embody some monstrous diseased imagination 
of the lunatic’s brain. For a moment it seemed as if thought could be 
conveyed by shape more effectively than by words. The monstrous 
quivering tadpole seemed to be fear itself, and not the statement ‘I am 
afraid’. In fact, the shadow was accidental and the effect unintentional. 
But if a shadow at a certain moment can suggest so much more than 
the actual gestures and words of men and women in a state of fear, it 
seems plain that the cinema has within its grasp innumerable symbols 
for emotions that have so far failed to find expression. Terror has 
besides its ordinary forms the shape of a tadpole; it burgeons, bulges, 
quivers, disappears. Anger is not merely rant and rhetoric, red faces 
and clenched fists. It is perhaps a black line wriggling upon a white 
sheet. Anna and Vronsky need no longer scowl and grimace. They have 
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at their command—but what? Is there, we ask, some secret language 
which we feel and see, but never speak, and, if so, could this be made 
visible to the eye? Is there any characteristic which thought possesses 
that can be rendered visible without the help of words? (350-351)
What are we to make of Woolf’s strange, almost bizarre, cinematic 
experience? She is watching The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari, Robert Wiene’s 
1920 horror classic, but it is not the tale of the mysterious asylum director 
and the murderous somnambulist Cesare that affects Woolf, but instead a 
momentary mechanical accident, when some kind of blot or smudge on the 
film reel is suddenly magnified on the screen over a brief series of frames. 
Why should the brief tadpole-like shadow have affected Woolf so?
From a psychoanalytic perspective the tadpole is none other than an 
instance of objet petit a, a glimpse of the real, where the symbolic, diegetic 
reality of the film is momentarily disrupted by a non-symbolic shape that 
defies any possibility of meaning. The tadpole is an object external to the 
diegetic film reality presented through the screen, and yet it appears on the 
screen in front of her eyes. Woolf writes that “the cinema has within its grasp 
innumerable symbols for emotions that have so far failed to find expression,” 
but here she has lost the point. The tadpole-like shadow unsettles Woolf 
precisely because it is not a symbol and does not signify any particular 
emotion or affect. Rather, it affects Woolf because for a brief moment it 
reveals—even though she does not consciously recognize it as such— the 
technical mechanics behind the constructed story-world reality of cinema. 
The tadpole betrays the wizard behind the screen— the rapid mechanics of 
the projector flashing 24 times a second, so fast that a tiny blot will magnify 
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to enormous proportions over the course of perhaps a single second and 
threaten to engulf the entire screen. If, as Doane suggests, cinema depends 
on our unconscious ability to repress or erase from experience the darkness 
between frames and our physical surroundings, then the appearence of the 
tadpole marks the breakdown of that primordial repression, a hole in the 
symbolic order. It is not that the shape of the tadpole is in itself a signifier 
of fear, but rather that its sudden, arbitrary appearance jolted Woolf out of 
her immersion in the diegetic reality of Dr. Caligari. The tadpole emerges 
in a liminal space, neither a part of the fictional reality within the film nor 
completely belonging to the outside reality of the audience sitting in the 
movie theatre.
Woolf’s experience suggests that the techno-somatic exclusion of 
“unperceived darkness” on which the illusion of cinematic motion depends 
in fact parallels and manifests our psychic exclusion of the pre-Symbolic, 
primordial other (that is, objet petit a, the “small” autre, not to be confused 
with the “big” Other of the Symbolic). As Jacques Lacan theorized, the 
consistency of our experience of reality depends on the primordial exclusion 
of the real from that reality. Thus Woolf’s experience suggests that the 
techno-somatic logic of film in its “proper” working state materializes and 
manifests our engagement with reality at the Imaginary and Symbolic levels: 
it is through excluding our immediate surroundings (in a theater, facing a 
silver screen, surrounded by darkness up to 40 percent of the time) that we 
can both limit and thereby construct a cinematic reality. The movie screen in 
effect serves as the material manifestation of the psychic boundary between 
two Symbolic realities, that of the film and that of the movie theatre, (not 
unlike the TV screen in Ring), and hence the collapse of the screen must 
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result in a return of the real.
How, then, are technological and psychic exclusion relevant for Tanizaki? 
In fact, the climactic moment of terror in the haunted film in “The Tumor 
with a Human Face” occurs precisely when exclusion fails. The moment 
of terror occurs as the film technician M immerses himself in the film, 
watching it alone in a dark room. Here is how Yurie’s friend H describes the 
scene of her character’s suicide at the end of the film, and the strange effect 
it had for M as well as various others who had watched the film alone:
That scene has a close-up of the lower half of your right knee to 
toenails, and the tumor protruding from your knee displays its most 
poignant expression, its lips twisted in a laugh so peculiar that it seemed 
on the verge of anguish, as if it were utterly obsessed. Suddenly, quite 
faintly, came the sound of its laughter, and faint though it was, they 
could hear it, without the shadow a doubt. (100)
This is a remarkable scene when we consider that Tanizaki was writing 
in 1918, fully a decade before the release of The Jazz Singer, as if he were 
foreseeing the eventual development of talkie technology. Nonetheless, for 
Tanizaki, film was a visual medium, the effect of which depended on the 
exclusion of sound and color. The emergence of sound—not in the form 
of meaningful dialogue but as laughter no less—marks a moment of pure 
horror in which the primordial repression that is the basis of ones access 
to a film’s internal reality breaks down. For the tumor’s laugh, again, is 
objet petit a directly addressing the film viewer from the space of the pre-
Symbolic other. What I mean is that the tumor’s silent laugh is a prime 
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example of a “partial object,” the voice of the primordial other that must be 
repressed and excluded for normal access to reality. We recall that voice 
and gaze are the two elements Lacan added to Sigmund Freud’s list of 
“partial objects” (the others being breasts, feces, and phallus). As partial 
objects, of course they are not on the side of the perceiving subject, but on 
the side of what the subject perceives. But the point is that they are a priori 
objects, always already confronting us from the position of the pre-Symbolic 
primordial other. When the address of the primordial other—whether it be 
a gaze directed at us from a blind spot, or the voice of an absent speaker, or 
the laughter of a silent face— is not properly repressed and excluded from 
reality, the outcome is none other than psychosis—hearing voices and 
seeing specters.
Immersing oneself in a silent, black-and-white film, Tanizaki suggests, 
is dependent on repressing one’s capacity to hear and to see in color. 
And the psychosis which overcomes the viewers of the haunted film, 
therefore, comes in the form of a techno-somatic return of the repressed. 
The microperceptual, existential question Tanizaki leaves unanswered at 
the end of his short story, therefore, is whether the failure to repress the 
tumor’s laughter is purely psychic or purely machinic, that is, whether M’s 
psychosis is a sensory or technological phenomenon. The only possible 
answer to this question is that these two modes of being—sensory and 
technological, somatic and machinic—cannot be unraveled from each other, 
that the cinema is a technologically embedded sensory mode of perception. 
In Tanizaki’s formulation, the experience of cinema finally collapses the 
possibility of distance between viewing subject and viewed object. Film is not 
an “external” object to look at and contemplate, but rather an experience in 
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which the subject immerses him or herself, and thereby allows subjectivity 
itself to be technologically embedded.
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